The unrest began in western Kazakhstan on January 2, 2022, sparked by outrage over a huge spike in gas prices. In the ensuing days, protests spread to most of the country’s major cities. Almaty, the former capital and Kazakhstan’s largest city, was shaken by massive riots on January 4.
“Those were the bloodiest uprisings and clashes between civil society and the state in the history of Kazakhstan,” said Christoph Mohr, the regional director of the Friedrich Ebert foundation in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. “I think everyone in Kazakhstan hopes and wishes that what happened in January 2022 does not repeat itself,” he added.
From January 5 to 7, administrative buildings were burned down across Kazakhstan, businesses and banks were plundered, the airport was occupied, and arms depots of the security services were looted. According to official numbers, across the country, what became known as the January tragedy claimed 238 lives, including about a dozen police officers.
“I visited Almaty last fall and noticed just how shocked people still were about the events,” said Beate Eschment, a researcher at the Centre for East European and International Studies who specializes in Central Asia. “I’ve known some of these people for many years, and they’ve changed — especially those who live in the city center and couldn’t leave their homes for days, and witnessed people being shot to death.”
Though civil society representatives consider the protests legitimate as they addressed earnest concerns about the job and housing markets, Mohr said “the government still speaks of ‘bandits’ or ‘criminals’ or ‘subversive elements.'” Mohr called this an indication of contradicting narratives. “To this day,” he said, “it’s unclear who died and under what circumstances they died.”
‘Extremely cautious’ changes
In response to the uprisings, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev promised comprehensive political and social change. Kazakhstan did introduce a change to the constitution in 2022 that transferred some powers from the executive branch to the legislature and held an early presidential election in November, moved up from the scheduled date in 2024. However, as usual, the election was neither free nor fair and Tokayev did not run against a strong opponent.
“Much has changed in the political system, but the reform measures are extremely cautious,” Eschment said. “I worry that they are, in fact, too cautious and too slow, because they are not taking the demands of the, admittedly small, group of oppositionists into account.”
One significant change preceded by Mohr and Eschment followed a constitutional referendum in June, in which Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was stripped of powers granted to him when he abruptly stepped down in 2019, after 29 years in power.
Reducing Nazarbayev’s influence
Nazarbayev had ruled Kazakhstan since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1990. And, even after relinquishing the presidency to his protege, Tokayev, he still carried the special title “Elbasy,” meaning “Leader of the Nation.” In the pre-2022 constitution, this granted him special lifelong policymaking privileges, as well as immunity from prosecution. As chairman of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan (APK) until 2021, and chairman of the Security Council of Kazakhstan until 2022, he had a say in the core tenets of domestic and foreign policy.
One of the protesters’ demands was that Nazarbayev be stripped of these privileges. In February 2022, Tokayev signed a bill to remove Nazarbayev from the role of chairman. However, this still left the former president as a member of the Constitutional Council, and he retained his right to speak before the Parliament and its chambers. These privileges were also removed with the constitutional referendum.
Eschment said this helped Tokayev emancipate himself from Nazarbayev’s influence, allowing him to lead without his predecessor meddling in the background. In addition, the political power of the Nazarbayev family, who also enjoyed immunity through extension of the “Elbasy” honorific, seems to have diminished, as well. However, their financial and economic might, amassed over nearly three decades of rule, appears untouched. “A substantial amount has been confiscated,” Eschment said, “but the state will not reach the bulk of their wealth.”
Mohr said Tokayev “significantly uprooted Nazarbayev’s former regime,” which had been marked by corruption, family nepotism and private interests that undermined the state. “He had people arrested,” Mohr said. “Now, they’re debating whether to remove his immunity from criminal proceedings.”
Eschment said the efforts to reduce Nazarbazev’s reach also helped Tokayev in November’s snap election. “At the time, Tokayev believed he had a good standing with the people, which could only spoil if he didn’t act,” Eschment said. “At least now, Tokayev can claim that he has his voters behind him,” Eschment added. “This is important, because he still isn’t backed by a network of elites that could strengthen his position in case he wants to enact more reform.”
Mohr said the snap elections and the constitutional reform were more of a “simulated response” to January 2022 than based on a good-faith effort to create a “Just and Fair Kazakhstan” as the government repeatedly claims. Members of the opposition are still being arrested; party pluralism is still being stifled. What matters most, Mohr said, is that the reforms announced are truly implemented.
How the war in Ukraine affects Kazakhstan
Both experts see Russia’s war on Ukraine as a key foreign policy event for Kazakhstan. The economic and domestic consequences are “ambivalent”, Mohr believes.
From a macroeconomic perspective, the influx of highly qualified workers, such as IT specialists fleeing Russia, as well as the shifting of international agencies from Moscow to Astana could be beneficial for the country. At the same time, this would also mean that urban residents would have to compete with Russian migrants, who are often more highly qualified and financially strong, for jobs and housing.
This could make the socioeconomic situation even more tenuous than in 2022, when the protests erupted. On the other hand, the experts believe the war in Ukraine could also help initiate momentum for further reforms in Kazakhstan as well as improve ties with the EU.
The future of Kazakh-Russian relations
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has strained Kazakhstan’s relations with the Kremlin. After Russia invade Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Kazakhstan’s government made clear that it did not share the Kremlin’s position and was not willing to provide support. “At the same time, Russia is a very close partner, whether historically, culturally, linguistically, economically or politically,” Mohr said.
“It would be naive to expect Kazakhstan to pivot towards Europe or China tomorrow,” Mohr added. Institutionally, Kazakhstan is bound to Russia through the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union. One could not expect massive overnight changes without risking an open conflict. That’s why Astana is more likely to try to improve trade relations with Europe and within Central Asia, so as to not upset Moscow.
“Tokayev does not want to confront Putin,” Eschment said. “That would be geopolitical suicide considering Kazakhstan’s 6,000 kilometers of indefensible border.”
Source : DW
